WHY DON'T POPULATION FORECASTS COME TRUE?
Demography has always been a social science in which quantification plays a relatively important role. The subdiscipline of analytical demography, or demometrics, was developed long before econometrics, psychometrics and sociometrics. Due to the fact that demography often uses exact reasoning, one might easily get the impression that causal relationships can be found and that reliable predictions can subsequently be made. This is a misconception.
Demography studies individual behaviour and the relationships between individuals. Thus an attempt is made to predict individual and group behaviour. Cf. quantum physics, a science in which the characteristics of minute particles are explained in order to learn something about the matter which is made up of these particles. In 1930, Heisenberg formulated his famous Uncertainty Principle: it is not possible to determine simultaneously and with absolute certainty the position and velocity of a particle. If we measure the exact position, the velocity is distorted, and vice versa (Heisenberg, 1953, p.30) .
It is therefore impossible to be 100% certain about the actual movement of individual particles, let alone to be able to predict their movement. If we describe the behaviour of such a particle we must bear in mind that chance plays a role. Only a large amount of such particles, such as a given volume of oxygen, can be described with sufficient certainty: at a given aggregate level the element of chance has been reduced to such an extent that it can be neglected. Heisenberg's Principle of Uncertainty undermined the prevailing ideas on mechanisms of chance and causality. Probability laws were no longer considered a product of human ignorance. Laplace's determinism and the belief in perfect predictability (derived from Newtonian astronomy) were abandoned. A certain degree of indeterminism or uncertainty started to become accepted. Thus the deductive-nomological interpretation of causality, explanation and prediction changed into an inductive-statistical approach.
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N. KEILMAN We can say that, analogous to the behaviour of elementary particles, it will never be possible to predict the behaviour of individuals with absolute certainty. Should we wish to describe such behaviour, we will have to resort to probability laws. This does not mean that our ignorance is short-lived: it is an established fact that human behaviour is indeterminate. Therefore, demographic behaviour cannot be predicted: we cannot give a 100% accurate statement on future demographic trends. Since uncertainty plays a role, we can only make a forecast: a plausible and realistic estimate of the future based on our knowledge of the present. A s with weather forecasts, the reliability and durability of such demographic forecasts are limited (Tennekes, 1984 (Tennekes, , 1984 .
All this means that when making population forecasts, we should continue to try to gain a better understanding of our demographic behaviour but we should also (even more than in the past) study the uncertainty that accompanies population forecasting. This is particularly important in view of the desired optimal use of population forecasts. It is surprising that forecasting uncertainty has so rarely been the subject of research. One of the reasons for this is the relatively long period of time needed for population forecasting (Keyfitz, 1984, p. 1 2 ) . Some 30 years are necessary for a thorough study of the reliability of such forecasts. Meteorologists only need a week in all to make a forecast, to compare it with the real situation and to make a new forecast; economists need anything from several months to a year; population forecasts may need as long as a generation. A second reason is that demographic forecasts, particularly those at the national level, are often officially authorised. This, added to the fact that a relatively small number of demographers are concerned with the future, means that competing forecasts are lacking. Thirdly, forecast users are not used to working with uncertainty. They want future population statistics (which form the basis of their planning) to be available as a single figure. They do not like working with probability distributions. Finally, many users of population forecasts are specialised in a particular field, such as housing, regional policy, transport, energy, economics etc. For them, uncertainty regarding future population trends is far less important than the uncertainty in their own specific field.
This paper gives an overview of the role of uncertainty in population forecasting. We will discuss the most important causes of forecasting errors, as well as the instruments used to measure uncertainty in deterministic and statistical analyses. Examples are derived from the post-war population forecasts of the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics. Although these forecasts apply to the national level, the points discussed here also are valid for regional and categorical forecasts.
SOURCES OF FORECASTING ERRORS
Population forecasts never come true, there is no doubt about that. On second thoughts, you never know when dealing with chance. It would therefore be better to say: the probability that a forecast will come true is zero. The terms forecasting error and uncertainty are closely connected to each other. We could put it like this: a forecasting error is observed uncertainty; uncertainty refers to the future, whereas a forecasting error refers to the past (SchGele, 1981, p.3) .
The process of population forecasting is made up of several steps. It is worthwile trying to find out in which stages of this process forecasting errors are usually generated. This can be done by distinguishing the following five types of errors (Hoem, 1973; Keyfitz, 1977,p.227 ). 1. Registration-, rounding-off and estimation errors of the observed trends. In countries like The Netherlands, such errors hardly have a bearing on the quality of the population forecast.
3.

.
in the estimated numbers of births, deaths and migrants are not taken into account in the current deterministic forecasting methods. However, a number of different studies have shown that errors caused by such simple extrapolations of (supposed) trends are very small (e.g. Sykes, 1969;  Schweder, 1 9 7 1 ) . Erroneous trends in forecasting parameters. If the quantitative course of real demographic trends differs substantially from the expected course, significant forecasting errors may result. Sudden shifts in the parameters. Large forecasting errors can also be the result of extreme circumstances such as wars, disasters, serious economic depressions and the like. Such circumstances are not very common, however. Inaccurate model specification. If one simulates the population trends over a known period with the aid of a forecasting model, the results should ideally correspond t o the observations. In the past, the international migration component was not always incorporated in national population forecasts, often resulting in rather serious forecasting errors. Now that international migration is taken into account, the models seem sufficiently valid.
The most profound forecasting errors are therefore caused by erroneous assumptions regarding trends in fertility, mortality and migration. Two stages in the assumption-making process account for this in particular. Firstly, when formulating future social and socio-demographic developments.
For example, statements such as "the position of the family in society will become less dominant", or "structural factors such as advancing emancipation and growing individualism contribute to the continuing fertility decline; an increasing number of women are following higher education and wish to practise in their field for as long as they possible can. This trend is likely to continue". Secondly, important errors are generated when formulating the so-called key as- sumptions, i.e. when social and socio-demographic hypotheses are translated into quantitative demographic indicators such as the average number of children per woman, the average life expectancy etc. Fertility will remain low in the future. But will the average number of children in 1990 be 1.3, or 1.5, or maybe 1.7? We don't know.
From the above, it is clear that the hypotheses used in a population forecast, in particular general assumptions and key assumptions, have a greater bearing on the quality of the forecast than the accuracy of the model. If the key assumptions are correct, the model is of secondary importance. But if they do not adequately reflect the future, a good model cannot save the forecast (Ascher, 1979, p.199) .
UNCERTAINTY IN DETERMINISTIC ANALYSIS
At present, national population forecasts are made with the aid of deterministic models. Despite the fact that randomness (quantified uncertainty) is lacking in these models, they can give us a deeperqualitative -insight into the uncertainty which is inherent to statements concerning the future. Three instruments are used for this purpose: variants, border-years and sensitivity analyses. The presentation. can also express the degree of uncertainty. These four aspects will be discussed below.
Variants
As early as 1933, Thompson an Whelpton published several variants of their estimates of the future population growth in the United States because they were not sure about the course the demographic components would take. Ever since, this has become common practice, stimulated, amongst others, by the United Nations. In the 1950's and 1960's, the Netherlands 56 N. KEILMAN Central Bureau of Statistics published one or two experimental variants, alongside the main variant in its population forecasts. It was clear however -by the presentaion of the results -that these secondary variants were considered less important than the main variant. Not until the 1970 forecast, did all variants carry equal weight.
Two points should be taken into consideration when choosing the components for which more than one hypothesis should be made (CBS, 1982, p.17 ).
1. The significance of each individual component for the results of the forecast. A 10% variation in the average number of children per woman generally results in greater fluctuations in the forecasting results than a 10% variation in the probability of on eventual divorce.
erratic the observed development of a given phenomenon, the more difficult it is to estimate its future course.
2.
The past course of the components. The more
The first consideration may be used when the outcome of the sensitivity analysis (to be discussed at a later stage) is known. The second consideration has to do with the fact that we know little about the quantitative relations between the demographic components and the underlying social, economic, cultural, political and technological factors. Here, we are interested in quantitative answers to questions such as :
-how does the increased emancipation of women influence the number of children a woman will bear?
-in which way does technological development influence mortality?
-to which extent will the demographic behaviour of cultural minorities presently living in our country differ from that of the total population in the future?
If the quantitative relations referred to here are not sufficiently known, this does not mean that the social and socio-demographic trends which in- fluence the forecasting components should not be taken into account. In such cases assumptions are indeed made, even though they are merely qualitative. However, due to the fact that quantitative insight is lacking into the relationships between social and socio-demographic trends on the one hand and the course of the demographic indicators on the other hand, no more than an extrapolation of the indicators can be made; of course the qualitative course of the indicators computed earlier is taken into account, Therefore, as long as a causal model for demographic components is not available, (in which -if ever found -chance is likely to continue to play an important role) we can, as a second-best-approach, simply look for stability within these demographic components.
In view of the above considerations, the CBS has, during the past years, used several quantitative key assumptions for birth, nuptiality, and international migration. For each of these components a high, a medium and a low assumption have been drawn up. By combining the 3 possibilities for the 3 components, 27 forecasting variants could, in theory, be computed. In practice, only the two extreme variants and the medium variant are used (CBS, 1982, p . 1 7 ) . The medium variant may be interpreted as the most plausible alternative at the time the forecast is made. Of course, the high and the low variants should also be plausible. The three variants are related, as is shown by the fact that they are all derived from only one set of general hypotheses and qualitative key assumptions. Such variants can be called "uncertainty variants". Their raison d'Ctre is the uncertainty that accompanies the act of quantifying qualitative key assumptions. When several qualitative key assumptipns and general hypotheses are used, we speak of "alternative futures". Up to a certain extent, this was the case in the 1975 CBS-forecast, in which two variants were used for fertility (see table 1). The low variant assumed a continued fertility decline in The Netherlands. The high variant, on the other hand, assumed a slight recovery following an initial decline. Consequently, the high variant spoke of postponement and catching-up of births, whereas the low variant spoke of a (partial) cessation. It speaks for itself that any interpretation that variants are 'alternative futures' and our definition of a forecast as being the most realistic future population trend, are contradictory.
The distance between corresponding variables in the high and in the low variant is indicative of the degree of uncertainty of the phenomenong in question. For example, the distance between the variants for international migration, known to be a rather erratic phenomenon, is quite large. In the 1984 forecast, the CBS assumed a net migration surplus for 1985 with a margin of 116% around the level of the middle variant. By 1990 the margin has reached 600%. The margin f o r the fertility is much smaller: 27% for the 1985 cohort. When determining the distance between the high and the low cohort, one must bear in mind that a wide margin is more reliable, but that it does not give precice information. "In 1986 the TFR will fluctuate between 1 and 2" is a reliable statement, but hardly precise. For the user, such 'it-may-happen-or-it-may-not* type of statements are not very valuable. Therefore, one of the most difficult tasks facing the forecaster is to arrive at an acceptable compromise between precision -the distance between the variants -and reliability -the probability that a forecast comes true (Van Dantzig, 1952, p. 197) . A good balance between the two can only be found, in fact, if we know how the forecast will be used. Since national forecasts are always "general-purpose" calculations, the forecasters will have to find an intuitive answer to the precision-reliability dilemma.
Border-years
The more distant the future, the greater the uncertainty. In population forecasts, uncertainty, which grows with time (sometimes very rapidly) can be attenuated in two different ways. Firstly, by enlarging the difference between the high and the low variant. Secondly, by defining a so-called borderyear for each component. We will here deal with the latter in more detail.
In the 1984 forecasts of the CBS, the future development of a component such as mortality is formulated until the year 1995. After this year the hypotheses remain constant, since it is barely possible to select a plausible mortality trend from a large range of possible future trends. The greater the uncertainty of a component, the closer the border-year will be to the year in which the forecast is made. The border-year chosen for international migration in the 1984 CBS-forecast was 1990. For fertility, nuptiality and remarriage the year chosen was 1995. Marriage of never-married persons and fertility remain constant after the year 2000, partly as a result of the fact that the course of these two phenomena, when analysed longitudinally, is fairly regular (see figures 1 and 2).
After the year 1990, in particular after the turn of the century, estimations are no longer called cforecastsc but are gradually known as "experimental calculations".
Sensitivity analyses
It is not always clear whether or not the selected course of an input variable is plausible. If a given variable does not influence, or hardly influences the forecast results there is no reason for concern. If, however, a 10% change in the variable drastically influences the results, several variants ought to be given. One can distinguish between important and unimportant variables by applying a sensitivity analysis. Such an analysis examines the effect of a 1% change in the input variables on the results of the forecast. This can be done analytically or empirically. In the analytical method, the formulas derived from differential calculus are applied to the model's formulas. Together, these input variables account for about 15% of the total number of variables. Extra attention should be given to these variables, both when making the hypotheses and while the forecast is being monitored.
We have now spoken about the analysis of the influence of changes in the input variables on the forecasts. Such a sensitivity analysis examines the assumptions. The impact of changes in the model structure can also be studied. Such a sensitivity analysis is almost always empirical.
Nelissen and Vossen (1983) have recently designed a short-term population forecasting model based on regression results where the demographic components were the dependent variables and the independent variables were the socio-economic, cultural and socio-psychological phenomena. Although the methodology of these authors is entirely different from that applied by the CBS, both approaches arrived at a rise in fertility at the end of the period 1980-1984 (see By comparing the forecasts with the observed figures, one can say that both forecasts regarding fertility were too high. We cannot, as yet, determine whether Nelissen and Vossen and the CBS have (prematurely) predicted a recovery which might still take place in the future.
It is surprising that there are so few competing forecasting models in Dutch demographic practice, as opposed to Dutch economic practice. It is advisable to follow the course taken by Nelissen and Vossen, paying particular attention to two points: 1. what causes the differences between the forecast results found by the various models? 2. how reliable are the forecasts of these models?
3.4.Presentation of the forecast
By presenting the forecasts in the correct manner the forecast-user can be made aware of the uncertainty of the results. The user should realise that he must not apply a planning methodology which assumes that population forecasts are very precise. It is of the utmost importance that decisions which have been based on population forecasts are robust against 64 N. KEILMAN possible forecasting mistakes, or else they should be sufficiently flexible so that they can be adjusted to revised forecasts (Baxter and Williams, 1978, p.68) .
If more than one variant is used, each one should be given the same amount of attention. Incorporating secondary variants in an appendix therefore serves little purpose. The results of uncertainty variants ought, where possible, to be mentioned simultaneously. Therefore, a statement such as "In the year 2000 our country will number 14.8 to 15.5 million people" is much more effective than "According to the medium variant our country will number some 15.1 million people in the year 2000; the low variant puts the number at 14.8 million and the high variant at 15.5 million".
This uncertainty can be emphasized in tables by placing the variants side by side, as shown in table 4. By doing s o , the user is more strongly confronted with the uncertainty than would be the case if three separate tables had been constructed. In elaborate tables, such as age-structure tables, this is not always possible since the table will become too confusing and therefore less useful.
Finally, presenting information on the size of a certain population category in units of a thousand is usually sufficiently precise; for information regarding the distant future, however, units of ten thousand or a hundred-thousand are to be preferred. An analysis of the degree of reliability for the population groups and the forecasting periods distinguished, can suggest which unit ought to be used. In view of the rapidly decreasing reliability of forecasts for periods exceeding 15 years, say, one should excercise the greatest care when publishing long-term forecasts.
Placing the results of a forecast in a historical context, can also give us an impression of the uncertainty. The more (often) one has to adjust the forecasts, the greater the uncertainty. The following passage, taken from 1984 CBS forecast (Cruijscn, 1985, p.40) 
Time series models
A large number of authors have tried to analyse demographic time series, in particular for fertility, with the aid of Box-Jenkins-type methods (Saboia, 1974 (Saboia, , 1977 Lee, 1974; McDonald, 1979 McDonald, , 1981 De Beer, 1984; Brunborg, 1984) . The internal structure of such a time series can usually be adequately modelled. The resulting forecasts are sometimes even better than those found with the aid of traditional techniques. Such an approach has a number of important drawbacks however .
First of all, a time series model for fertility is only suitable for short term forecasts. The confidence interval increases sharply: after 5 years the 95% interval constitutes some 30% of the point estimate, after 15 years roughly 50%. In addition, such a model is based on stationary fertility trends, which in reality only exist for short periods of time. Secondly, time series models may yield alternative models which differ considerably, yet it is often impossible to make an a priori choice between them. One can therefore conclude that time series models quantify the uncertainty satisfactorily, but that they should be used with care. They are particularly useful for determining short-term confidence intervals, i.e., the distance between the high and the low variant for the first years of a forecast.
Markov models
The second approach to quantifying uncertainty in population forecasts is by way of Markov models and their generalisations. The variables of the forecasting model are, in fact, made stochastic. Either the Leslie matrix (including fertility and survival rates) is written as a stochastic matrix, or else a vector with random fluctuations is added to the population vector. In both cases the forecast -made according to the classical approach -can be seen as the average of the stochastic forecast (Feichtinger, 1971, p. 8 ) . The studies of Pollard (1966) 
Schweder (19711, Le Bras (1974) and Sch6ele (1981) are based on this principle.
The conclusions presented in these studies are not very encouraging. If we restrict ourselves to random fluctuations of the fertility and mortality rates (the second source of forecasting errors -see section 2 ) the effect is minimal. The biggest mistakes are made because of erroneous assumptions regarding the future trends of the input variables. When such a trend is described in a stochastic process the mathematical problems become formidable: it is no longer possible to derive simultaneous confidence intervals analytically. Therefore, elaborate simulations will be needed.
Valid modelling of the components will remain problematic, however. The classical approach seems more effective for estimating the trend -in particular in the long term -than an approach that uses stochastic processes. The advantages of both approaches can be combined by applying so-called subjective probability distributions. As is the case in traditional forecasting, the future course of a number of characteristic input variables of each component is determined subjectively; for example, the average number of children and the age distribution at birth. These variables are considered to be parameters of probability distributions.
The form of this probability distribution has been chosen a priori. In a number of simulations a whole range of forecast results may be produced by letting the computer draw from the given probability distribution at each simulation. Pflaumer ( 1 9 8 4 ) constructed a stochastic Lesliematrix for West Germany with the aid of subjective probability distributions. He assumed that the TFR would be at least 1.2 and at the most 1.8, with a median of 1.4 children per woman. He presupposed that in two consecutive five-yearly periods the realisations of the TFR did not differ by more than 0.5 children per woman; the median of the difference was 0.3 children per woman. Thus an autocorrelation structure was added to the TFR. Pflaumer made analogous assumptions for mortality and international migration. He determined, by way of a Monte Carlosimulation, that in the year 2050 the probability that the population of West Germany will lie between 35.4 and 44.3 million people is 90%. In the year 2000 this 90% interval will amount to 57.2 -60.7 million.
Analysis of forecast errors
Researchers working with time series analyses and Markov models were primarily concerned with explaining observed trends. However, if one is interested in forecast uncertainty, existing forecasts should be evaluated and the forecast errors found should be analysed. If, by doing so, a certain degree of regularity is found, a forecast can be made of these forecast errors.
Within the field of demography, Keyfitz ( 1 9 8 1 ) and Stoto ( 1 9 8 3 ) have elaborated on this idea. They The average error shows that on the whole the forecasts in the period 1950-1984 only deviated slightly from the observed total population. The average is negative, which means that the actual numbers have been underestimated. The average absolute error is much bigger than the average error. Therefore, the underestimations in the period 1950-1965 have amply compensated for the post-1965 overestimations. The 0.22 percentage points of the standard deviation compares favourably with the 0.29 percentage points found by Keyfitz for countries resembling the Netherlands. It was apparently relatively easy to make a foreca~t in our country.
If we wish to say anything about errors in future forecasts we had best restrict ourselves to our experiences of the 1970's. As a result of the abrupt fertility decline after 1964, the forecast errors were excessively large in the 1960's. In the 1950's on the other hand the forecast errors were relatively small because the demographic trends were very regular.
In the 1970's the average forecast error was 0.09 percentage points; the population increase was sume that the 1984 forecast will be neither worse nor better than the average post-1970 forecast, then the probability that the population will amount to anything between 14.7 and 15.5 million in the year 2000 will be about 2 to 1 (66%). In figure 3 this 2/3 confidence interval is compared with the variants of the 1984 CBS-forecast. The odds that the CBS-forecast comes true are at an almost constant level of 2 to 1. A similar value has recently been found for the population forecast of the United States (Land, 1985,p.ll) .
The evaluation of forecast errors ought to be much more refined than the procedure described above. Firstly, the forecast results used should include variables other than just the total population size. Secondly, the analysis of forecast errors should be more thorough than in the past. Several standards should be used to evaluate the difference between a forecast and an observation. Granger and Newbold (1977, p. 278-289) have discussed how macro-economic forecasts ought to be evaluated. Kuijsten (1984) studies the suitability of a standard introduced by Keyfitz, namely the "quality of prediction" (sic). In addition, a time series analysis of the forecast errors could lead to better forecasts of these errors, than the forecasts made according to the method of Keyfitz and Stoto. Decomposing the forecast errors for the total population by age group, yields the following picture for the post-war CBS-forecasts (see figure 4) .
We see an overestimation of the young age categories and an underestimation of the older age categories. There is a clear overestimation of fertility in the 1965 to 1972 forecasts. The underestimation of the aged population is the result of excessively pessimistic assumptions regarding mortality. A s the forecast period rises, forecast errors grow, but for ages between 10 and 74 years the error does not exceed plusminus 2%. The forecast error grows quickly for the older age groups in particular where the forecast period exceeds 10 years. In Norway and Denmark similar forecast errors have been found (Leeson, p. 97; Brunborg, 1984, p. 14). It is thus relatively difficult to make a precise forecast for people over 75 years.
The relatively big forecast errors for the 0-4 year age groups call for a more accurate analysis of the reliability of fertility forecasts. To this end, a number of standards have been used: the mean error (ME), the mean absolute error (MAE), the root mean square error (RMS), the mean percentage error (MPE), the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE), and the root mean square percentage error (RMSPE). The ME, MAE and RMSE are defined in terms of the same unit of measurement as the variable to which they refer. In the ME, overestimations are compensated for by underestimations, in the MAE over-and underestimations have the same weight. The RMSE gives much weight to big errors, whereas the ME and MAE give the same weight t o all errors. The MPE, MAPE and the RMSE are independent of the unit of measurement of the given variable. They can therefore be used to compare totally different situations.
In table 6 the 1950's forecasts underestimate the fertility and the post-1965 forecasts overestimate the fertility. The mean absolute error fluctuates between 2.2 thousand, that is 1.0% (1951 forecast, after 5 years) and 102 thousand, or 53.5% (1965 forecast, after 15 years).
These errors are similar to those of the post-war fertility forecasts of the United States (Ahlburg, 1982) . If we look at the relative (percentage) forecast errors, we see that it was just. as difficult, if not more difficult, to forecast the fertility in 1970 and in 1972, than it had been in 19b5, The most striking conclusion that can be drawn from table 5 is that forkcast errors did not drop to a few percent until 1975. The transition from a period analysis of fertility, applied up to and including the 1965 forecast, to a cohort analysis, as from the 1970 forecast did therefore not immediately result in an increased reliability.
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----------------------------------------------------------Forecast period ME MAE RMSE MPE MAPE RMSPE should be given to these variables -they might even be eligible for more than one variant. Once the forecast has been issued, these crucial variables should be monitored most carefully.
---------------------------------------------------------
When presenting the results, the uncertainty should be apparent. Users of forecasts should reckon with imprecise population estimates. Decisions taken on the basis of population forecasts should either be robust against the expected forecasting errors, or else they should be flexible enough to be adjusted as soon as improved (revised) population forecasts are issued. When presenting the results, the uncertainty can be emphasized by presenting the results of the variants simultaneously. It is not advisable to incorporate the -supposedly -most plausible variant in the text itself and to insert the secondary variants in an appendix.
It is possible to gain guantitative insight into the uncertainty which is inherent to population forecasts by constructing time series models for the individual components as well as Markov-type forecasting models, and by analysing forecasting errors. Time series models are particularly useful for shortterm forecasts. More attention should, in future, be given to the evaluation of existing forecasts, in an attempt to detect any regularities in the forecasting errors and to explain them. Only then can a forecast be made of the errors themselves. To this end, time series analysis may be used. This brings us a step beyond a mere explanation of the present, an explanation which will always retain a high degree of uncertainty.
